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I. 
As described by Schmitt, political theology as such has its origin in 
the secularisation of religious forms and structures.
1 Schmitt and his intellectual descendants have tended to focus on 
what  scholars  of  religion  might  characterise  as  explicit  religion: 
deliberately constructed structures which are clearly differentiated 
from secular culture, clearly articulated doctrines, and behaviours 
which  require  particular  effort  on  the  part  of  individuals  (e.g., 
church  attendance).  However,  I  argue  that  this  approach  gives 
insufficient  attention  to  implicit religion,2 and  particularly  to  the 
afterlives  of  theological  doctrines  as  pre-philosophical  intuitions, 
underlying and frequently unexamined assumptions about the way 
the world works which inform the way that  both individuals  and 
societies structure their lives.3 For example, while messianism itself 
is too highly developed as an explicitly philosophical concept to be 
described  as  a  pre-philosophical  intuition,  an  examination  of 
statements  about  messianism  can  reveal  several  underlying 
assumptions that do, more often than not, pass unexamined: that 
the state of the world as it is leaves something to be desired, that 
the state of the world is capable of being improved upon (these are 
not the same thing), that some extraordinary effort or impetus is 
required to bring about an alteration in the state of the world. It is 
assumptions such as these that universalism is most likely to be 
undone by, as they can reveal instances in which the same signifier 
points  to  radically  different  concepts—in  the  words  of  the  great 
semiotician Inigo Montoya, “that word […] I  don’t think it  means 
what you think it does.”4
This is  one important function of  community-based inter-religious 
dialogue: the move past sitting a group of people with very different 
beliefs in the same room and persuading them to overlook their 
outward differences and historical disagreements to agree that they 
all  believe,  more  or  less,  in  the  same things,  with  those  things 
defined  by  vaguely  positive  words  like  “peace”  and  “love”  and 
“justice”.5 The more philosophically serious dialogue programmes—
of which Scriptural Reasoning is by far the most well-known—push 
people  to  unpack,  from within  their  traditions,  exactly  what  the 
content  of  these  vague  things  that  “we  all  believe  in”  is,  and 
discover that it’s  probably not  quite  the same.6 The goal  of  this 
exercise is to break down the false understanding of sameness in 
order that a better understanding of, and respect for, differences—
what  Hannah  Arendt  terms  ‘plurality’—might,  eventually,  be 
constructed.7 
In this article, then, I am interested in probing beneath the surface 
of the concept of redemption, particularly as it has tended to be 
mobilised in Jewish-Christian dialogue. This particular inter-religious 
dialogue is still somewhat in a state of reaction against centuries of 
the  adversos  Judaeos tradition  of  Christian  exegetics,  which 
portrayed  Jews  and  Judaism  as  inverted  Christians:  hopeless, 
corrupt,  and  through  their  own  choice,  beyond  the  reach  of 
redemption.8 The extent to which this tradition became part of not 
only  the  pre-philosophical  intuition  that  governed  social  and 
political activity in Europe and its colonies, but also, in many places 
and times,  a firm and explicit  policy of  exclusion,  is  a matter of 
historical record.9 Following the atrocities of the last century, there 
was a move, especially on the part of Christian theologians—such 
as Jürgen Moltman, Dorothee Sölle, Alice and Roy Eckhardt, Krister 
Stendahl,  and  the  Second  Vatican  Council,  to  name  a  few—to 
expose, examine, and cast out the negative assumptions inherited 
from  the  adversos legacy  and  to  emphasise  a  common  ground 
between Christianity and Judaism. While this theological turn is, of 
course, an extremely welcome corrective, it is only a first step, a 
step into sameness.10 Even this first step is not entirely complete; it 
is  still,  to  this  day,  quite  easy to find remnants of  the  adversos 
tradition  mobilised  in  both  popular  preaching  and  in  academic 
theology.11 And there is good reason for this: Jews and Christians do 
not  actually  believe  in,  or  hope  for,  the  same  things.  This  is 
particularly true with regards to the key issue of  redemption (as 
well  as  the  closely  related issues  of  justice  and hope),  which  is 
among the terms on which constructive,  we-all-believe-the-same-
thing dialogue has been built and upon which it is most likely to 
stumble. It is not sufficient to base inter-religious understanding on 
the idea that redemption is a good idea, or even that justice and 
redemption are things towards which hope ought to be directed, 
without any understanding of the content of these terms. A careful 
examination  of  the  conceptual  framework  underlying  such 
terminology  reveals  that  Jewish  thought  is  not  a  straightforward 
counternarrative to the Christian-influenced philosophy of the West 
(as the adversos tradition would have expected) but a complication 
of the discourse, a reminder that our words don’t necessarily mean 
the same thing to everyone that we think they mean.12
II.
The possibility of a world which might not be redeemed is a minority 
opinion within the wider scope of Jewish tradition, but it has been 
particularly  influential  in  post-Holocaust  theologies.  In  his  most 
famous  essay  on  the  subject,  Richard  Rubenstein  recounted  a 
meeting with a German Evangelical pastor, Dean Heinrich Gruber. 
Gruber’s conversation with Rubenstein was clearly informed by the 
faith  that  had  led  him  to  active  resistance  and  sustained  him 
through  internment  in  Sachsenhausen.  Citing  Psalm  44,  Gruber 
expressed his conviction that, in the Holocaust, Germany had been 
bent to the service of God’s will—that the Holocaust was actively 
necessary to God’s plan for the redemption of the world. Rubenstein 
recognises  a  consistency  between  Gruber  and  other  German 
Evangelical  theologians  who  he  had  met, 13 but  also  between 
Gruber’s  view  of  divine  providence  and  that  espoused  by  many 
Orthodox Rabbis, and so casts Gruber as the representative of the 
religion which Rubenstein argues must be rejected:
If  I  believed  in  God  as  the  omnipotent  author  of  the 
historical drama and Israel as His Chosen People, I had to 
accept Dean Gruber’s conclusion that it  was God’s will 
that Hitler committed six million Jews to slaughter. I could 
not possibly believe in such a God nor could I believe in 
Israel as the chosen people of God after Auschwitz.14
Rubenstein was one of the earliest  Jewish theologians to directly 
address the Holocaust in English, and his work was quickly taken up 
by  the  radical  Christian  Death-of-God  theological  movement,15 
contributing  to  a  popular  understanding  of  the  Holocaust  as 
fundamentally  altering  the  nature  of  Jewish  religious  belief  and 
practice.16 But Rubenstein’s rejection of the idea of a God who is 
present  in  history  was  also  predicated  on  an  extremely  limited 
understanding of the scope of Jewish thought, which approached 
the Holocaust as an event without precedent, and did not embrace 
medieval or modern sources which might otherwise have provided 
a model for wrestling with belief in the face of catastrophe.17
The mystical concept of the world fractured at the point of creation, 
as  presented  in  the  creation  myth  of  Lurianic  kabbalah—an 
elaboration on the spirituality of Chassedi Ashkenaz that developed 
in  the  shadow  of  the  Rhineland  massacres,  which  was  itself 
prompted in part by the trauma of the Spanish expulsion—can be 
read  as  implying  not  just  a  substantial  degree  of  human 
responsibility  for  the  ongoing redemption of  creation,  but  also  a 
substantial degree of divine incompetence and neglect. Moreover, 
the relation between these two implications is causative: humans 
become responsible for the redemption of creation as a direct result 
of divine inadequacy; in some readings of this tradition, the purpose 
of humanity is to redeem God’s mistakes.18 
In  Jewish  theology,  discourse  about  God’s  presence in  history  is 
always also discourse about  the validity  of  the Biblical  covenant 
between God and the Jewish people: does history demonstrate that 
God has kept God’s promises? Who is responsible, or indebted, to 
whom?  The  mutuality  of  the  covenant,  the  fact  that  it  makes 
demands on both Jews and God, points to the fact that what the 
covenant  is  actually  doing  is  providing  a  formal  structure  for  a 
dialogical  relationship,19 a  space in  which  shared values may be 
negotiated.  Attempts  to  argue  for  the  continued  validity  of  the 
covenant, for the continued presence of God in history, over and 
against the apparent witness of history itself, are attempts to find 
some way to sustain this relational  space within the world.  This, 
then, is the context for messianic movements in Jewish history: at 
the moments  when God can least  be depended upon,  kol  Israel 
becomes responsible for its own redemption.20
III.
In  contrast  to  this  dialogic  model  of  redemption,  Christianity 
understands the flaw in the present world to originate from human 
disobedience to God’s plan,21 and perceives God, in the person of 
Jesus Christ, as the main protagonist (if not the sole actor) in the 
redemptive drama—and it is a drama, with exposition, climax, and 
denouement  all  already  written.  While  it  would  be  an  unfair 
dismissal of the wide array of very good and interesting work being 
done in Christian theology to suggest that all that remains is for 
humanity to wait patiently for the eschatological curtain to fall, it is 
reasonable to say that the majority of this work is oriented towards 
discerning  (and  enacting)  humanity’s  responsibilities  in  light  of 
Christ’s already successful redemption of creation. 
The  results  of  this  alternate  narrative  of  redemption  are  two 
important  assumptions  which  derive  naturally—though  not 
inevitably—from this broad theological framework. First, and most 
simply:  redemption  being  assured  to  the  point  of  having  been 
already  accomplished  permits  the  future  ultimately  to  be 
considered  with  a  strong  sense  of  optimism,  in  which  historical 
disasters are understood as temporary setbacks, rather than epoch-
making experiences which necessitate a  re-consideration of  core 
theological premises.22  This assurance, in large part, fuels the myth 
of  progress which itself  has played a significant role  in  Europe’s 
imperial and colonial history.23 Second: an idea of redemption which 
comes from outside  of  the  world  lends  itself  to  universalism far 
more  readily  than  does  an  idea  of  redemption  which  relies  on 
particularly  located  human  effort.  Granted,  the  drive  for 
universalism is also an explicit doctrine of Christianity (Matthew 28: 
18-20), which has itself been bound up in colonial history;24 what I 
am suggesting is that even without this explicit encouragement, the 
redemptive  metanarrative  of  Christianity  still  gives  rise  to  the 
common  evangelical  assumption  that  anyone  who  does  not 
participate in the belief system has simply failed to understand it 
properly.25 
While  these sketches  have been necessarily  briefer  and  broader 
than I might wish, I hope that laying them side-by-side serves to 
illuminate  the  problematique  of  inter-religious  language  which  I 
identified at the beginning of this essay. When an individual whose 
model of redemption is primarily dialogic and an individual whose 
model  of  redemption  is  primarily  theocentric  enter  into 
conversation on the premise that both share a vision of a redeemed 
world, they are in fact beginning from a mistaken premise—a fact 
with which more recent developments in interfaith dialogue have 
begun  to  contend.26 More  problematically,  however,  when  the 
concept of redemption enters into the political sphere, divested of 
the  theological  trappings  that  might  otherwise  prompt  an 
examination  of  the  underlying  assumptions  which  operate 
coextensive with it, it is liable to produce the illusion of a shared 
culture  (the  Judeo-Christian  values  beloved  of  conservative 
politicians throughout the English-speaking world), and any attempt 
to correct this  illusion is  seen as,  if  not an outright  attack,  then 
certainly  a  wilful  and  perverse  dissent  from  the  project  of  a 
common good.
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